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Abstract: In this paper, we present a concolic execution technique for detecting SQL injection vulnerabilities in Android apps,
with a new tool we called ConsiDroid. We extend the source code of apps with mocking technique, such that the execution of
original source code is not affected. The extended source code can be treated as Java applications and may be executed by SPF
with concolic execution. We automatically produce a DummyMain class out of static analysis such that the essential functions are
called sequentially and, the events leading to vulnerable functions are triggered.
We extend SPF with taint analysis in ConsiDroid. For making taint analysis possible, we introduce a new technique of symbolic
mock classes in order to ease the propagation of tainted values in the code. An SQL injection vulnerability is detected through
receiving a tainted value by a vulnerable function. Besides, ConsiDroid takes advantage of static analysis to adjust SPF in order
to inspect only suspicious paths. To illustrate the applicability of ConsiDroid, we have inspected randomly selected 140 apps from
F-Droid repository. From these apps, we found three apps vulnerable to SQL injection. To verify their vulnerability, we analyzed the
apps manually based on ConsiDroidâA˘Z´s reports by using Robolectric.
1 Introduction
At the end of 2017, 2.7 million devices used the Android operat-
ing system [1]. It makes 88 percent of total mobile devices [2].
Also, there were 3.3 million apps available on Google Play in March
2018. These numbers show that Android is the most popular OS
among users and developers. Hence, it is a favorite target for attack-
ers in order to exploit security vulnerabilities on Android apps to
affect a large number of victims. For preventing such attacks, various
approaches are presented. There exists a set of approaches such as
[3–7] based on static analysis to detect security vulnerabilities. These
approaches have inherited the natural weakness of static analysis,
i.e., high false alarm rates and the inability of analyzing dynamic
code loaded at runtime.
Dynamic analysis is another approach, which overcome the static
analysis weakness. In this approach, unlike static analysis, the app
is analyzed when it is running. To run apps, the input data and
events that trigger their various parts should be generated artifi-
cially. There are two main techniques used in dynamic approaches
for input generation, i.e., fuzzing and concolic input generation [8].
Fuzzing generates the inputs randomly. However, this technique suf-
fers from low code coverage. For instance, Android Monkey [9] is
a fuzzer for Android apps. Concolic input generation technique sup-
ports high code coverage, and hence, more states of the program
are inspected during the analysis (see Section 2.1). This technique
improves the symbolic analysis technique, by which, variables are
represented symbolically, and their values are chosen by a con-
straint solver to cover more execution paths of a program. In this
technique, a program is executed with symbolic and concrete input
values simultaneously to resolve cases when the constraint solver
cannot generate new inputs for symbolic values. In this paper, we
choose concolic executions to analysis more lines of code. It worth
mentioning that there is not any concolic and even symbolic engine
for testing Android apps. Therefore, we are going to use and extend
SPF∗ [10], a symbolic extension of Java Pathfinder, in order to
∗Symbolic Path Finder
test and detect vulnerabilities in Android apps by using the con-
colic testing technique. In this paper, we present a tool which we
call ConsiDroid, an abbreviation for Concolic-based SQL Injection
vulnerability detection tool in AnDroid Apps.
For concolic execution of an Android app by SPF, we extend apps
under the test to make them behave like Java programs. Android
apps have no “main” function as their entry point. They have differ-
ent ways of starting to run, such as tapping a URL or receiving an
incoming call. Without changing the source code, we extend the test
app by adding new classes, which indicate how to start running the
app. Such new classes were already introduced in [11], which we call
them DummyMain classes in this paper. They are produced through
static analysis of the app. Unlike Sig-Droid, we produce them in such
a way that only events leading to call a vulnerable function are con-
sidered. Our aim of such a method is to overcome the path explosion
problem of concolic execution. Google provides an SDK∗ to ease
the development of Android apps. These apps are built by extend-
ing the Google SDK, which turns to an inseparable part of the apps.
Concolic execution of Android apps in SPF is impossible without
the existence of SDK classes, which we trust in. Presence of SDK
classes during concolic executions lead to path divergence problem.
Hence, we use the mock class idea [11] to emulate SDK function-
ality. Mock classes are the same as real ones except that the bodies
of their class functions have been omitted. Also, their return values
have been replaced with default ones.
The quality of an app code is a category in OWASP Mobile Top 10
[12]. Our focus is SQL injection vulnerability as it is directly related
to the quality of code. This attack happens when the inputs fed into
SQL related functions are not adequately controlled. Nonetheless,
there exist other related vulnerabilities which our approach is suit-
able for them, like OS shell injection. We also modify and extend
the concolic engine in SPF to optimally detect SQL injection vul-
nerabilities. For detecting this kind of vulnerabilities, we use taint
analysis, which tracks values from sources to sinks. We perform a
dynamic taint analysis through concolic execution with the help of
∗Software Development Kit
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Fig. 1: Execution tree for listing 1; the left and right child nodes
indicate the else and then branches, respectively.
1 void testMe(int x, int y){
2 if(y>5){
3 if(x*x*x > 10){
4 assert(false);
5 }
6 }
7 }
8 void main (){
9 int x=symbolic_input();
10 int y=symbolic_input();
11 testMe(x,y);
12 }
Listing 1: Simple code in C for testing with concolic execu-
tion.
the symbolic mock classes idea. Besides, we take advantage of static
analysis for enhancing the performance of ConsiDroid. To this aim,
we automatically extract vulnerable paths through static analysis
and give them precedence during concolic execution. With this idea,
the time analysis reduces considerably. To evaluate our technique,
besides manually developed apps, we randomly selected 140 real-
world apps from F-Droid [13], which is an open source repository
for Android apps. As a result, ConsiDroid could detect three vulner-
able apps correctly. Also, we observe that the increase in time and
code coverage of our dynamic analysis are smaller than the increase
in test apps complexity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
covers some background about concolic execution, Android OS,
challenges of concolic execution in Android apps, taint analysis, and
SQL injection vulnerability. Section 3 gives an overview of Con-
siDroid. Section 4 describes how to produce DummyMain classes
and vulnerable paths. Section 5 gives information about mock and
symbolic mock classes. Section 6 presents the ideas that are used
in extended concolic execution for detecting SQL injection vulner-
ability. To validate the results of ConsiDroid, we manually explore
the derived vulnerable paths by our tool with the help of Robolec-
tric tool in Section 7. To illustrate the applicability of ConsiDroid
in real-world apps, we apply it to several applications in Section 8.
Section 9 is about related work and the paper is concluded in Section
11.
2 Background
In this part, we introduce concolic execution and its pros and cons
briefly. Besides, we explain some essential topics in Android. We
discuss challenges when dealing with concolic testing of Android
apps. We explain taint analysis as we use it to track the flow of values
to detect SQL injection. Finally, we present the conditions that an
attacker needs to exploit for SQL injection.
2.1 Concolic Execution
Concolic execution means simultaneously executing a program with
symbolic and concrete values. In symbolic execution, we consider
some values as symbolic. For instance, the simple code in Listing
1 is executed with the symbolic variables X0 for x (line 9) and Y0
for y (line 10). In this approach, conditions are essential points. Path
conditions are logical conjunction of conditions, which are collected
during the execution of a specific path. For example, in testMe func-
tion, one path condition can be (Y0 > 5 ∧X0 ×X0 ×X0 ≤ 10).
A path condition indicates which branches of the code have been
executed recently. The execution tree of a program is the mixture
of all path conditions (Fig. 1). The intermediate nodes contain con-
straints while the leaf nodes contain the real values satisfying the
constraints over the path. The constraint solver generates these con-
straints. In symbolic execution, we want to cover all possible paths
in the execution tree. Therefore, we execute the code and construct
a path condition during the execution. For each conditional state-
ment, symbolic execution is forked to cover both then and else
branches. Finally, the execution tree of the program is built. For pro-
ducing a test input for a specific path in the execution tree, we use
a constraint solver like SMT, which solves logical expressions and
produces suitable values. Constraint solvers have some weakness in
solving some complex expressions like non-linear expressions, e. g.,
(X0 ×X0 ×X0 ≤ 10). In pure symbolic execution, testing of the
code is stopped at this point, and we are not able to produce test
inputs to execute some lines of code like line 4.
For alleviating the problem, concolic execution is used, which
executes the code with concrete values in addition to symbolic ones.
First, concrete values are generated randomly. Assume that x = 0
and y = −1. These values produce the condition (PC1 = Y0 ≤
5). New concrete values are generated by negating the last con-
straint in the path condition (¬(Y0 ≤ 5) = (Y0 > 5)). A constraint
solver can solve the condition (Y0 > 5), resulting in x = 0 and
y = 6 as the new values. These new values build the path condition
(PC2 = Y0 > 5 ∧X0 ×X0 ×X0 ≤ 10). Whenever a constraint
solver cannot solve an expression, concrete values are randomly gen-
erated (y = 6 and x = 11). With this trick, we may reach points in
code that cannot be explored during symbolic execution (line 4). So,
the concolic execution has better code coverage than pure symbolic
execution.
With concolic execution, the problems of static analysis, i.e., the
existence of false alarms[14] and the ignorance of code loaded at
runtime [8], are handled as the code are executed. However, concolic
execution has some issues:
• Path explosion: When we analyze real-world programs, we face
too many lines of code. Hence, their execution trees contain a
large number of paths. Testing in this situation is time and memory
consuming. We tackle this problem by presenting our hybrid con-
colic execution for testing Android apps. In this approach, we take
advantage of static analysis to make concolic execution targeted.
• Frameworks and environment modeling: Many programs are
developed with frameworks. It means that a developer uses third-
party libraries and software kits. In our testing approach, we trust
this kind of code, and we only test developersâA˘Z´ program. Also, in
different systems, we face a different kind of environmental issues.
For example, in the Android system, apps have event-driven nature,
and we should model these events. In this work, we use the idea of
mock classes [11]. Also, we present symbolic mock classes as our
idea in order to overcome these issues.
Furthermore, we use SPF[10] as a concolic engine, and we extend
it in order to detect SQL injection vulnerability in Android apps.
SPF is built on JPF[15], a Java bytecode model checking tool. In
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Fig. 2: A simplified illustration of activity lifecycle [16].
SPF, bytecode is converted to 3-address intermediate instructions.
These instructions execute on a modified JVM. SPF supports dif-
ferent kind of constraint solvers, including solvers which support
strings. Also, in SPF, we can indicate which variables or methods
should be symbolic.
2.2 Challenges on Concolic Execution in Android Apps
An Android app consists of some activities. An activity manages
pages that can be seen on the device screen by users. According to
the Android developer documentation, the activity lifecycle is spec-
ified by different states that its instances move between them. Each
activity class provides a number of callback functions by which the
activity instance is informed that its state has changed. For example,
the system is creating, stopping, or resuming an activity, or destroy-
ing the process in which the activity resides [16]. In Fig.2, an activity
lifecycle is shown. Each activity includes some visual components,
which are implemented by the widget package like Button, EditText,
and TextView. We call them widgets in this paper. Each widget has a
unique ID, which is collected in the R class of an app. With this ID,
developers could access supporting widget class methods.
Android offers a mechanism for inter-process communication
(IPC) using remote procedure calls, by which a method is called
by activity or other application components, but executed remotely
(in another process), while its result is returned to the caller [17].
With the content provider, it hides the details of how the interprocess
communication is managed.
As we mentioned before, Google SDK is an inseparable part
of Android apps, which has an event-driven nature. Therefore, in
the concolic execution of Android apps, one problem is modeling
events. Usually, Android apps are written in Java, but there are fun-
damental differences between Android and Java programs. Also, we
utilize SPF as the concolic execution engine since there is no con-
colic and even symbolic engine for Android apps. Challenges of
testing Android apps with concolic execution are:
• Android code is run within DVM∗. It means that code is com-
piled to Dalvik bytecode. However, Java code is run within JVM and
compiled to Java bytecode. Besides, unlike Java programs, which
start from the main function, there is no such function in Android
apps. These apps are event-driven, so they can start by tapping an
icon or by receiving an SMS and tapping a URL within a text. To
use Java engine, we change android code in order to run it within
JVM. For this goal, we produce DummyMain classes by static anal-
ysis from which the Android programs start. This class simulates
∗Dalvik Virtual Machine
the events as the consequence of the user involvement or operating
system interaction by calling related functions.
• Android apps are too dependent on the SDK. Therefore, it causes
path divergence in testing [18]. In symbolic execution, path diver-
gence means the execution of a path leads to call a framework
or a library function with symbolic values, making the execution
diverge from the developed code. Path divergence causes two main
problems:
◦ It is possible that while testing these libraries or frameworks, func-
tions do not exist. For example, they exist in the device but not in the
testing environment.
◦ If we assume that these methods are present, some constraints are
added to the path condition due to the conditional statements in their
body. Therefore, instead of focusing on developer code, we stuck
with testing of the framework or third-party libraries code, which we
trust in them.
As a typical example, accessing and modifying data communi-
cated between apps are possible by IPC mechanisms. For example,
data stored in SQLite database of an app can be accessed by other
apps with this mechanism. To this aim, the first app sends its query
to SDK. Then, SDK sends it to the other app. For testing SQL injec-
tion vulnerability through IPC, path divergence problem is essential.
To overcome this issue, we present the idea of mock classes.
2.3 Taint Analysis
The purpose of taint analysis is to track information flow between
sources and sinks [19]. Tainted values are derived from sources, and
other values are treated as untainted. For each taint analysis, a pol-
icy is defined and enforced. The policy determines which values
are tainted, how they propagate through the program, and how they
should be analyzed.
In this work, we are going to use dynamic taint analysis in order
to detect SQL injection vulnerability in Android apps. In our anal-
ysis, sources are the inputs of an app, and sinks are the vulnerable
functions. As the source and sink functions belong to SDK classes,
so they are used within mock classes. We make the input and out-
put values of these functions symbolic, to denote tainted values, and
hence, the resulting classes are called symbolic mock classes. Our
taint propagation and SQL injection vulnerability detection policy
are explained in sections 6.2 and 6.3, respectively.
2.4 SQL Injection in App or through IPC
Android apps use an SQLite database for storing data. SDK pro-
vides some libraries to manage using SQLite. There are secure and
insecure methods for implementing database queries in this library.
For implementing securely, the developer should use parametric
functions in the SDK. In parametric functions, a developer uses “?"
character instead of user inputs. In the database, when a parametric
function is used, first the parse tree of the query is built and then the
user data substitute for “?" in the tree. This method prevents inject-
ing commands in queries. In Listing. 2, lines 2 and 3 are an example
of the insecure and secure method of building queries, respectively.
Android provides a mechanism for accessing and modifying other
app data like SQLite databases if the second app permits. This fea-
ture is possible through IPC. If the developer of the second app does
not use parametric functions, then SQL injection is possible between
the two apps.
1 String st = editText.getText().toString();
2 Cursor c = db.rawQuery("SELECT * FROM student WHERE
stdno = '"+st+"'", null); //inecure way↪→
3 Cursor c = db.rawQuery("SELECT * FROM student WHERE
stdno=?'", new String[]{st});//secure way↪→
4 textView.setText(buffer);
Listing 2: Secure and insecure way of building query in Android
IET Research Journals, pp. 1–10
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Fig. 3: Overview of ConsiDroid.
List of all functions in SDK through which SQL injection is
possible is {query, queryWithFactory, rawQuery, rawQueryWith-
Factory, update, updateWithOnConfilict, delete, execSQL}.
For detecting an SQL injection vulnerability, the following con-
ditions should be present in apps: 1) existence of a path from an app
input to a vulnerable function, 2) don’t use of parametric functions,
and finally 3) the result of query propagates to leakage functions
by which an attacker can access the result of a database query. For
example, printing the result on screen by TextView is considered as a
leakage function. In this paper, we focus on the classic form of SQL
injection due to our goal in this work is not supporting complicated
kind of injections e.g., blind, time-based.
3 Overview of ConsiDroid
An overview of ConsiDroid is given in Fig. 3. Also, we describe each
part with the help of a simple android app (Listing 3). ConsiDroid
has five main parts:
1. Static Analysis: By static analysis, we have two primary goals.
First is producing the main function in order to compile and run the
app in JVM. We produce the main function in a class, which we call
it DummyMain. We extend each app’s code with a set of Dummy-
Main classes, which each of them is a possible execution path in the
original app. Second is optimizing our dynamic analysis. To over-
come the path explosion problem of concolic execution, we make
our analysis hybrid and targeted. In other words, through static anal-
ysis, we limit the execution of an app to the desired paths, called
vulnerable paths, during our concolic execution.
2. Mock and Symbolic Mock Classes:As we mentioned before,
we use SPF. Therefore, for running Android apps on JVM, SDK
libraries and its functions should be modeled. We use mock classes
for modeling the SDK. Besides, for our taint analysis, we need to
1 public class MainActivity extends Activity{
2 protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState){
3 super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
4 EditText et=(EditText)findViewById(R.id.editText);
5 final String st=et.getText().toString();
6 Button b=(Button)findViewById(R.id.button);
7 //some code for inserting data in db.
8 b.setOnClickListener(new View.OnClickListener(){
9 public void onClick(View v){
10 db.rawQuery("SELECT * FROM student where
stdno='"+st+"'");↪→
11 }
12 });
13 }
14 }
Listing 3: Simple Vulnerable Android App.
track the propagation of tainted variables from source to sink func-
tions. We present symbolic mock classes idea for some specific SDK
libraries to complete our taint analysis.
3. Extended Concolic Execution Engine: Our concolic execution
engine is SPF, which is a Java testing tool. With extending Android
app code by DummyMain, mock, and symbolic mock classes with-
out changing the original app’s code, we can test them on SPF.
We extend SPF in two aspects. First, we develop a component for
SQL injection vulnerability detection. Second, we manage concolic
execution to examine the vulnerable paths extracted by our static
analysis at first.
4. Vulnerability Detection Report:Our analysis results help devel-
opers to patch their apps and fix SQL injection vulnerabilities. In
the report, we present the ID and the name of the source and sink
functions. Also, we expose the stack trace of the program from the
source to each vulnerable function. Besides, if parametric functions
were not utilized to secure the code, we highlight them in our report.
Also, we present the input of the vulnerable function, which helps
the analyst and developer to detect and fix the vulnerability. In List-
ing 4, the vulnerability report for Listing 3 is shown with all the
above details.
5. Robolectric: For validating our result, we use Robolectric [20],
which is a unit testing tool for Android apps. For testing an app with
Robolectric, we should specify the testing path. We use Dummy-
Main class and vulnerability detection report to build Robolectric
test inputs.
As a summary, before analyzing, we need to change the android
app to a java program. To this aim, we extend the android app
with DummyMain class and necessary mock and symbolic mock
classes. Then our extended concolic execution engine can analyze
the program. For example, extending the Android app that is shown
in Listing 3 is done by coupling DummyMain class in Listing 5.
Also, we embed mock classes such as Activity, Bundle, and Button.
Besides, we join symbolic mock classes such as EditText (List-
ing 6 (Right)), TextView, and SQLiteDatabase. ConsiDroid analyzes
1 //STACK TRACE:
2 1)android.database.sqlite.SQLiteDatabase.
rawQueryWithFactory(SQLiteDatabase$CursorFactory,
String,String[],String,CancellationSignal)
↪→
↪→
3 2)android.database.sqlite.SQLiteDatabase.
rawQuery(String,String[])↪→
4 3)com.example.lab.testak_textinput.MainActivity$.
onClick(View)↪→
5 4)com.example.lab.testak_textinput.dummyMain.
main(String[])↪→
6 //APP'S INPUTS THAT CAUSE INJECTION VULNERABILIY:
7 1)R.id.editText//developer sanitizer for this input is
OFF↪→
8 //OBJECT THAT CAUSE LEAKAGE:
9 1)android.widget.TextView.setText()
10 //INPUTS OF VULNERABLE FUNCTION
11 1)"SELECT * FROM student where stdno='"+st+"'"
Listing 4: Sample Vulnerability Detection Report.
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Fig. 4: The call graph of a simple app.
1 public class DummyMain {
2 public static void main(String[] args) {
3 MainActivity ma=new MainActivity();
4 ma.onCreate(null);
5 Button b = (Button)ma.findViewById(
R.id.button);↪→
6 b.performClick();
7 }
8 }
Listing 5: A sample of DummyMain class.
the extended app and produces the vulnerability detection report
(Listing 4). Each item in this section is explained next.
4 Static Analysis
In our approach, we take advantage of static analysis to produce
DummyMain classes. Our smart generation method causes the exe-
cution tree of the app to be pruned. Furthermore, we prioritize
the paths of the resulting execution tree by static analysis to make
dynamic analysis to explore its vulnerable paths at first. We use
the Soot[21] framework to analyze apps statically. Soot extracts the
essential graphs that our static analysis relies on. In this part, we
discuss our algorithms.
4.1 Generation of DummyMain classes
As we mentioned before, unlike Java programs, there is no “main"
function in Android apps. Therefore, for testing an app on SPF and
running them on JVM, we need to extend its code. Our extending
class is called DummyMain, which is produced by using static analy-
sis without any changes in the original app’s code. For static analysis,
we take advantage of the call graph (CG) of the program, which is
built by the Soot framework. This graph is based on Android fea-
tures and produced by connecting all possible sequences of calling
functions to its root node. If we traverse the CG by a DFS algorithm,
we can generate all possible DummyMain classes. For optimizing
our analysis, we focus on testing extended apps with DummyMain
classes, which lead to call one of the vulnerable functions during
their execution. We traverse the CG backward from each vulnera-
ble function to the root node, and a DummyManin class is generated
from each possible backward path. It worth mentioning that if there
is not any vulnerable function in an app, we do not continue its anal-
ysis. During the backward traversal of CGs, we collect information
about called functions. There are three different types of functions.
The first type is Normal, which is built by a developer in an app.
Second is Listener that the name of its class contains the special
character “$". This type of functions is called when an event is pro-
duced. Besides, for calling these functions, first, we should call their
corresponding parent class that its name is obtained by omitting $
suffix. For distigushing android event functions from inner classes
may define in an app, we take advantage of a list. We produce the list
with the name of all possible event functions. The third is Android
framework functions, for example, functions which are called in the
life cycle of activity. These kinds of functions are called in Dum-
myMain class when we want to call a class extending the Activity
class.
As an example, in Fig. 4, the CG of the simple app in List-
ing. 3 is shown. This app consists of one activity. Also, there are
Button, EditText, and TextView in MainActivity. When Button is
clicked, the string fed in EditText is used to generate an SQLite
query, and the result of the query is passed to TextView. Only one
DummyMain class is generated for analyzing this app, as shown
in Listing 5. For producing this DummyMain class, we start from
node 5, which contains a vulnerable function. By backward traver-
sal, we visit the node 3, which is a listener function and then
the root node. For building the code, we start from the last node
except the root in our backward traversal, which is node 3. The
vulnerable function SQLiteDatabase.query() is called by MainAc-
tivity$1.onClick(). Therefore, we should produce code that causes
executing the onClick function. The parent class of the listener
function onClick is MainActivity, which extends Activity. As we
mentioned before, for listener functions, their parent classes should
be called first, resulting in the code at line 3 in Listing 5. Besides, line
4 is added because MainActivity extends Activity. Therefore, func-
tions which are related to the Android framework should be called in
order to follow up on the Activity life cycle, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
For brevity, the other functions of the life cycle have been omitted
here. The listener onClick is performed when an event is produced
by the interaction of users with the app. In DummyMain, we simu-
late this event by the code at lines 5 and 6. By static analysis of the
MainActivity code, we find ID (R.id.button) and type (Button) of the
relating component with the onClick listener function. Line 6 is the
code which simulates the tap event on the Button.
4.2 Prioritize execution paths
We optimize our dynamic analysis by limiting it to test the execu-
tion paths of an extended app with DummyMain classes leading to
call vulnerable functions. We improve these tests by forcing SPF to
execute our desired paths at first. By this idea, first, we visit nodes in
the execution tree of the extended app that are on vulnerable paths.
By static analysis, Soot extracts inter-control flow graph (ICFG) of
the app, which contains function calls in addition to the control
flow graph of each function. We find vulnerable paths from ICFG
by backward traversing from a vulnerable function call to the root
node. During the traversal, we collect information about each con-
ditional statements. For each conditional branch, we also push the
precedence of then branch over else or vice versa in a stack. We use
stack because in concolic execution, unlike our static analysis, we
traverse the execution tree in a forward fashion. Therefore, the top
entry in the stack is referred to the first conditional statement in the
concolic execution.
In Fig. 5, a simple ICFG is shown. Without our static analysis,
SPF executes it by a DFS algorithm in which then branches have
precedence over else in conditional statements. Our static analysis
extracts the vulnerable path passing through 1,2,3,6 and 8 nodes. In
the stack, we push precedence of then for the node 3 and after that
else branch for the node 2. Therefore, after visiting the nodes 1 and
2, we force SPF to execute node 3 and then force it to run the node 6.
By this idea, concolic execution analyzes the vulnerable path at first.
5 Mock and Symbolic Mock Classes
Mock classes are the same as their corresponding real ones except
that the bodies of their functions have been removed. Also, their
return values have been changed to default ones. For example, in
IET Research Journals, pp. 1–10
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Fig. 5: A sample of an ICFG: the node labeled by “Error” denotes a
runtime exception statement while an empty node denotes a regular
statement.
Listing 6 (left), a part of EditText’s mock class is shown. In this
class, the return value of getText function is set to null at line 7.
Symbolic mock classes are the same as mock ones except that sym-
bolic values are returned instead of the default value. In Listing 6
(right) line 7, the return value of getText has been made symbolic
by makeSymbolicString, which is an SPF engine function. For run-
ning extended Android apps on JVM and preventing path divergence
problem, we need to mock SDK classes. Mocking SDK classes need
hard effort in order to simulate the Android environment. To this aim,
we produce them manually. We produce them concerning the logic
of the target app and Android apps life cycle. The idea of mocked
classes come from the function summary method [22]. The func-
tion summary method was introduced to prevent multiple executions
of specific functions over different runs. By this method, the body
of each function is tested at most once. During the execution of a
body, constraints from conditional statements are collected. In the
next function calls, instead of executing the function again, these
constraints are added to the path condition. We take advantage of
this idea within the mock class idea. In mocking, the default con-
straints of functions are always “true". Therefore, they have not any
effect on the path conditions of the app.
In addition to mock classes, we also produce symbolic mock for
some specific SDK classes, which contain input or vulnerable func-
tions. As we mentioned in Section 2.3, we perform our taint analysis
in parallel with concolic execution by making tainted values sym-
bolic. Symbolic mock classes help us in this context. It means that
we make the input values of an app and also the result of vulnerable
functions tainted.
6 Extended Concolic Execution Engine
For detecting SQL injection vulnerability, we use dynamic taint anal-
ysis. For detecting the vulnerability, we should define our security
policy of the detection [19]. We define our security policy in Sections
6.2 and 6.3 after discussing our optimization approach in Section
6.1. It worth mentioning that for concolic execution, we extend SPF
to support targeted concolic execution. Besides, we develop new a
component for SPF in order to support SQL injection vulnerability
detection.
6.1 Targeted Concolic Execution
We limit our analysis to extended apps with DummyMain classes,
which lead to calling vulnerable functions. Besides, for optimizing
concolic execution, we use the vulnerable paths, which are found by
our static analysis (see Section 4). SPF analyzes the program and
traverses the execution tree forward in concolic execution. For each
conditional statement in the code, SPF has two choices, e.g., then and
else branches. By default, SPF chooses the then branch. Therefore,
SPF traverses the tree with a DFS algorithm. We prioritize branches,
collected in the stack through the static analysis, which is explained
in Section 4.2. By the help of our extension, SPF first analyzes the
vulnerable paths. By this idea, we improve the time and memory of
analysis.
6.2 Dynamic Taint Analysis
Injection attacks occur by manipulating the input data of a program
and make them malicious. The input of an Android app could be at
various points, such as user interface, network, file, system notifica-
tions, and IPC. From these points, data enter the app and propagate.
If there is a path from input channels to vulnerable functions, there
could be a chance for injection vulnerability. Also, a successful
injection attack happens when the result of vulnerable functions
propagates to leakage functions to be observed by an attacker. Leak-
age functions are widgets in various points such as user interface,
network, file, and IPC.
To reduce the number of false alarms, we use dynamic taint
analysis for detecting injection vulnerability. For this goal, we use
concolic execution in combination with taint analysis by making
tainted values symbolic. SPF can make specific variables symbolic.
With SPF and symbolic mocked classes, we perform dynamic taint
analysis for Android apps.
6.3 SQL Injection Detection
Apps connect to their SQLite database or may connect to other app-
sâA˘Z´ database with IPC mechanisms. In both scenarios, there is a
possibility of SQL injection vulnerability. We design an algorithm
and develop it as an SPF component for detecting SQL injection
based on dynamic taint analysis and concolic execution.
In our analysis, we should produce symbolic mock of some
classes for tracking the propagation of symbolic values in the pro-
gram as tainted values. These symbolic mock classes are inputs of
the app like EditText or classes containing vulnerable functions like
SQLiteDatabase. For supporting SQL injection detection through
IPC (see Sections 2.2 and 2.4), it is enough to produce a mock
class for ContentProvider of SDK by removing all statements except
SQLiteDatabase function call statements in the body of its functions.
ContentProvider is the name of implemented SDK class for content
provider concept.
We run the concolic execution until a vulnerable function is
called. Next, we check its input argument. If the input contains a
symbolic variable (e.g., it is tainted value), then we check if its
function development is parametric or not (see section 2.4). If it is
not parametric, there could be a chance of injection vulnerability.
Otherwise, it is secure. For completing the chain of a vulnerability
1 public class EditText extends View {
2 private String content;
3 public EditText(String text) {
4 this.content = text;
5 }
6 public String getText() {
7 return null;
8 }
1 public class EditText extends View {
2 private String content;
3 public EditText(String text) {
4 this.content = text;
5 }
6 public String getText() {
7 return makeSymbolicString();
8 }
Fig. 6: The mock (left) and symbolic mock (right) classes generated for EditText
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occurrence, we continue concolic execution until a leakage func-
tion’s call. If the input argument of the leakage function is symbolic,
which is coming from the result of the vulnerable function, we found
a path from an input to a vulnerable function proceeded by a leakage
function.
7 Exploitability Testing by Robolectric
By dynamic taint analysis, we find all the paths in a program,
which conforms with our detection security policy. For ensuring the
result of ConsiDroid, we use Robolectric, which is a testing tool for
Android apps and independent of the Android environment for its
tests. Robolectric needs a target path for testing. In our work, we use
DummyMain class (see Listing 5) and vulnerability detection report
(see Listing 4) as its inputs to generate the Robolectric test input.
In Listing 6, an input of Robolectric is shown. There are many
similarities between this code and the code of Listing 5. Lines 4, 5,
6 and 8 are new in this code. The new lines contain IDs of the input
(line 4) and leakage (line 5) widgets, which have been collected in
the report. For testing SQL injection, we use malicious inputs like
âA˘IJa’ or ’1’=’1âA˘I˙ (line 6). For testing other types of SQL injec-
tion vulnerability, we should use other input strings, which we can
guess them by the query input in the vulnerability detection report.
The output of Robolectric execution, which is the result of a mali-
cious query leaked by âA˘IJtvâA˘I˙ object, can prove the existence of
vulnerability (line 8).
8 Evaluation
To evaluate ConsiDroid, we formulate three research questions:
1. Is ConsiDroid capable of generating test cases for real-world
Android apps?
2. How scalable is the approach in detecting SQL injection vulner-
abilities for real-world apps?
3. How well does ConsiDroid perform? Can ConsiDroid detect
SQL injection vulnerabilities in a reasonable time? How much code
coverage is needed to detect a vulnerability?
In our experiments, we use Ubuntu Linux 16.04 installed on a
virtual machine with 12 gigabytes RAM, configured with one pro-
cessor. This VM is running on a machine with Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-6700 3.4GHz processor.
We choose the apps randomly without any limitation.
According to apps total number of methods, we have catego-
rized them into seven types (Table 1). The total number of methods
has a direct effect on finding vulnerable methods in each app. To
1 public void SqlInjection_Exploitability() throws
Exception {↪→
2 Activity ma =
Robolectric.setupActivity(MainActivity.class);↪→
3 Button b= (Button) ma.findViewById(R.id.button);
4 EditText et = (EditText)
ma.findViewById(R.id.editText);↪→
5 TextView tv = (TextView)
ma.findViewById(R.id.textview);↪→
6 et.setText("a' or '1'='1");
7 b.performClick();
8 Logger.error((String) tv.getText(),null);
9 }
Listing 6: A sample input code of Robolectric for exploiting the app.
Table 1 Open-source apps, selected randomly from F-Droid.
Apps Total
Methods
Max Number
of Activities
Suspected
Apps
Type-0 22 < 5000 9 1
Type-1 10 5000 - 10000 18 3
Type-2 28 10000 - 15000 9 1
Type-3 31 15000 - 20000 20 6
Type-4 29 20000 - 25000 21 1
Type-5 16 25000 - 30000 16 1
Type-6 4 > 30000 7 1
characterize each type of category, we have also measured the max-
imum number of activities of its apps∗. As a result, ConsiDroid
generated DummyMain classes only for 14 apps (due to the exis-
tence of at least one path from a vulnerable function to the root
of their CGs) by its static analysis. It means that ConsiDroid can
not find any vulnerable functions or suspected paths in other apps.
We checked the correctness of our generation by reviewing the apps
manually before applying our dynamic analysis. From these apps,
five cases can be analyzed by ConsiDroid, and nine of them can not
be investigated due to their code obfuscation. As we know, static
analysis approaches cannot handle obfuscated code. All the five apps
were reported by our dynamic analyzer vulnerable to SQL injection
except two that were protected by parametric functions. We eval-
uated the reports by using Robolectric, as explained in Section 7,
and they were genuinely vulnerable to SQL injection. From these
five vulnerable apps, one of them was vulnerable through the IPC
mechanism.
For addressing question 2, ConsiDroid can find SQL injection
vulnerability in apps with different types (Table 1). To show the com-
plexity of these apps, we characterize the 14 suspected apps in terms
of two additional features (Table 2). These features are the number
of exploited SDK classes and the maximum method call sequence
depth†. The number of SDK classes specifies the hardness of produc-
ing mock classes while the maximum method call sequence depth
determines the difficulty of producing DummyMain classes. We also
added three vulnerable apps at the end of the table, one known and
two manually generated. The apps that dynamic analysis was not
applied to them (due to the false-positive result by the static analy-
sis) have been specified by N/A (Not Applied) flag in the “Result”
column. The apps that were reported vulnerable to SQL injection but
protected by parametric have been identified by N flag. The apps
with Y flag were reported as vulnerable.
Our dynamic analysis was applied to eight apps. We measure the
complexity of them by four metrics, which examine how apps’ com-
plexity affects the execution time of the dynamic analysis. Also,
these metrics study the scalability of our approach. These metrics
are the total number of methods (No. M), the number of exploited
SDK classes (No. SDK), the maximum number of activities (No.
Act), and the maximum method call sequence depth (Max MCS). To
this aim, we computed the percentile rank of their metrics, as shown
in Table 3. Following the approach of [11], the complexity class of
each app can be computed in terms of the percentile rank of their
metrics. An application belongs to the 10th overall complexity class
if it belongs to the 10th percentile in the four dimensions. In other
∗We extracted the total number of methods, SDK methods, and activities
for each app with the help of apkanalyzer[23] tool. This tool works on the
dexcode of a class or method in smali format.
†We extracted the maximum method call sequence depth with the help of
Soot. It worth mentioning that Soot analyzes Android apps in Jimple for-
mat, which is a simplified version of Java source code that has a maximum
of three components per statement.
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Table 2 Specification of 17 apps, which is analyzed as suspected in static phase.
Name Type Total Methods SDK Methods Activity Max Method Call Sequence Result
clock Type-0 1306 532 3 17 N/A
mandarin Type-1 6930 2240 18 21 N/A
ktodo Type-1 8716 2725 4 13 N/A
silectric Type-1 8984 2488 5 6 N/A
musicplayer Type-2 13112 3564 4 10 Y
simpleaccounting Type-3 15086 4290 6 13 N/A
freetrackgps Type-3 16385 3677 9 16 Y
iseeu Type-3 16670 4052 2 15 Y
tinykeepass Type-3 16975 4393 4 18 N/A
Tweetin Type-3 18962 3768 7 12 N/A
smsdroid Type-3 19067 4667 12 15 N*
reminder Type-4 20287 4626 3 7 N
blackberrymanager Type-5 28635 5759 8 33 N/A
WifiLocationLogger Type-6 37017 6375 1 15 N/A
sieve** Type-0 4006 1210 8 10 Y
testak-1*** Type-4 21533 4991 1 5 Y
testak-2*** Type-4 21537 4996 2 5 Y
* This app used ContentProvider.
** This app is used by OWASP.
*** These apps are developed by author.
Table 3 Characterization of apps in terms of the percentile rank of their complexity metrics. The number of produced DummyMain classes, the amount of time and
code coverage needed to detect SQL injection vulnerability are present.
Name No. M No. SDK No. Act Max MCS Time(ms) Code Coverage Produced DummyMains
musicplayer 34% 34% 58% 34% 49 52% 3
freetrackgps 45% 37% 90% 66% 22 33% 8
iseeu 49% 45% 21% 60% 13 24% 2
smsdroid 61% 64% 95% 59% 23 36% 2
reminder 66% 62% 40% 19% 17 26% 3
sieve 12% 12% 86% 33% 24 31% 4
testak-1 72% 71% 2% 4% 41 46% 2
testak-2 73% 72% 22% 6% 37 44% 3
words, an app belonging to a lower class is less complicated concern-
ing all four dimensions compared to an app from a higher class. As
it is illustrated in this table, “smsdriod” is the most sophisticated app
among them. The increase in the app complexity results in a small
increase in our dynamic analysis execution time due to our targeted
analysis. We can conclude that ConsiDroid is capable of scaling to
even the most complex Android apps.
For answering question 3, we present the time and the amount
of the code coverage of analyzing each app with ConsiDroid for
detection of SQL injection vulnerability in table 3. Besides, we have
shown the number of produced DummyMain classes for each app.
With ConsiDroid, we could find the vulnerability almost with less
than 50% of the code coverage as a result of our targeted analysis
in a reasonable time. As we mentioned before, we present the first
tool in this community for finding a vulnerability in Android apps
with concolic execution technique. So, there is not any similar tool
for comparison with ConsiDroid.
9 Related Work
DART [14] is the first work that presented concolic execution
method for testing programs. KLEE [24] is another tool for concolic
execution. In this work unlike DART, in conditional statements, both
branches are executed in parallel for enhancing the time of testing.
DART and KLEE are just for C programs. Also, there are some other
tool like SAGE [25], AEG [26] and Mayhem [27] for detecting soft-
ware vulnerabilities. Besides, to detecting vulnerabilities, AEG and
Mayhem produce exploit code automatically. These works support
Windows or UNIX based operating systems.
ACTEVE [28] is the first paper on testing Android apps with con-
colic execution. This tool only supports tap event sequences with a
maximum length of four. Condroid [29], an extension of ACTEVE,
detects logic bomb Android malware. AppIntent [30] is a tool for
detecting privacy violation in Android apps with concolic execution.
AppIntent uses static taint analysis in order to enhance concolic exe-
cution and make a targeted concolic analysis. Malton [31] is a tool
for detecting Android malware apps by using binary analysis with
the assistance of Valgrind [32]. Malton analyzes the app inside the
device, so there is no need for producing mock classes. Sig-Droid
[11] is a tool for testing Android apps with symbolic execution. We
were inspired by this tool for producing mock classes of SDK and
using SPF. In paper [33] a tool is introduced for detecting Android
framework vulnerabilities with symbolic execution. The target of
this tool is the Android framework and not Android apps. To the
best of our knowledge, our research is the first one for detecting SQL
injection vulnerability in Android apps.
In table 4, there is a comparison between ConsiDroid and other
Android testing tools with different dynamic approaches. As it is
shown, this comparison is based on searching methods, supporting
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Table 4 Comparison of ConsiDroid with other dynamic testing Android tools.
Tool Search method Events Static + Dynamic Analysis Path explosion problem
Monkey Random Text, System, GUI No -
ACTEVE Concolic GUI(Tap Event) No Yes
Sig-Droid Symbolic Text, GUI No Yes
ConsiDroid Concolic Text, System, GUI Yes No
Table 5 Comparison of ConsiDroid with similar security concolic- or symbolic-based tools.
Tool Event-Driven Path explosion Static + Dynamic Analysis Logic Bomb Detection SQL Injection
Vulnerability Detection
Privacy Violation
Detection
AppIntent Yes No Yes No No Yes
Condroid Yes Yes No Yes No No
Sig-Droid Yes Yes No No No No
ConsiDroid Yes No Yes No Yes No
event types, if they exploit static analysis to enhance their dynamic
approach, and the path explosion problem in the tools, which is not
applicable to Monkey.
Furthermore, we have compared ConsiDroid with concolic or
symbolic execution-based tools in table 5.Our comparison is based
on features which are supporting event-driven nature of Android
apps, the path explosion problem in the tools, utilizing static analysis
in concolic or symbolic execution, and security related issues such
as logic bomb, SQL injection vulnerability, and privacy violation
detection.
Furthermore, there exist tools for identifying a different kind of
information leakage in android apps. These tools are based on static
and dynamic taint analysis. Flowdroid[21] is a static taint analysis
tool, which we use it to extract CG and CFG of the app in order to
produce DummyMain class. TaintDroid[34] is a dynamic taint anal-
ysis tool for capturing information leakages in android apps, which
its dynamic approach is not concolic or symbolic. Shahriar et al.[35]
presenting KLD-based detection of content leakage vulnerabili-
ties based on three secure programming principles. Their approach
focused on ContentProvider leakage, which ConsiDroid can detect
them with the symbolic mock class idea. Demissie et al.[36] present
a dynamic and a static taint analysis approach for detecting Android
Wicked Delegation, which is based on IPC mechanism.
10 Discussion
Although ConsiDroid is the first Android apps vulnerability detec-
tion tool, there are several open problems which need to be dealt
with in future work and improvements. ConsiDroid only can detect
classic SQL injection vulnerability. There are other complex types
of SQL injection like blind SQL injection, which we do not sup-
port. For other types of SQL injection, we need to study a different
type of leakage functions. Also, there are other kinds of vulnerabil-
ities, which ConsiDroid cannot analyze them. For detecting other
kinds of injections such as OS Shell injection, it is required to
study vulnerable functions and produce appropriate symbolic mock
classes. Besides, the vulnerability detection policy should be modi-
fied, and SPF component adjusted accordingly. However, for another
kind of vulnerabilities, it needs more research and study. Besides,
ConsiDroid is a vulnerability detection tool and not an automatic
exploit generation tool. It needs hard effort to enhance ConsiDroid
for automatically generate exploits.
ConsiDroid could only analyze Java coded Android apps. There
are apps, which are developed with native or combination of Java
and native code. Analyzing these kinds of apps is another direction
in future works. ConsiDroid takes advantages of SPF and mocking
technique for concolic execution. We generate mock classes man-
ually, which is a time-consuming procedure. As future work, we
suggest automating it by extending the code of Robolectric.
Furthermore, ConsiDroid could be enhanced by modeling SDK
and Android environment following the same approach as [37] and
[38]. Another idea could be presenting an Android concolic engine,
which works on Dalvik bytecode or ARM binaries on emulators.
With this idea, we do not need mock classes anymore. With this
idea, we can analyze obfuscated apps, which ConsiDroid can not
analyze them. It worth mentioning that our static analysis for pro-
ducing DummyMain classes are not accurate. ConsiDroid could be
improved in the future by mapping the nodes of CG to ICFG to
compute vulnerable paths more precisely.
For evaluating ConsiDroid, we take advantage of F-Droid[13]
repository apps, which are real-world apps without any tags. There
exist a dataset called DroidBench[39], which consist of a bunch of
apps for testing taint analysis. Problem with DroidBench is that
it does not support a different kind of vulnerabilities like SQL
injection. In future, we can extend this repository for supporting
vulnerabilities.
11 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a new technique for detecting SQL injec-
tion vulnerability in Android apps and a new tool which we called
ConsiDroid. In our technique, we managed the lack of Android
concolic execution engine by taking advantage of SPF, which is a
Java concolic execution engine. For concolic execution of suspected
paths in Android apps with SPF, we produced DummyMain classes
by backward traversal of app’s call graph. Also, we optimized the
analysis by giving precedence to the vulnerable paths in concolic
execution. For detecting SQL injection vulnerability in Android
apps, we combined concolic execution with dynamic taint analysis
by symbolic mock classes idea. To achieve this aim, we extended
SPF accordingly. As a result, we provided useful information for
patching the vulnerabilities in the report. We evaluate ConsiDroid
with real-world and open source apps of F-Droid repository. We
select 140 apps randomly. From selected apps, ConsiDroid could
detect three vulnerable apps accurately. Also, we examine the per-
formance of ConsiDroid based on maximum method call sequence,
the number of methods, SDK methods, and activities. Our experi-
ment shows that increasing complexity of apps has a small effect on
time and code coverage of test apps.
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